Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence
Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the
Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine
Daniel R. Fischelt
With government regulation of the economy proliferating,
courts increasingly face the question whether private parties can
jointly attempt to attain anticompetitive ends by petitioning the
government without violating the Sherman Act.' Adverse effects on
competition may result from the petitioning activity itself or from
the government action sought. While the broad language of the
Act 2 could be construed to prohibit all such joint efforts as
"combination[s] . . . in restraint of trade," the Supreme Court
has rejected this interpretation. 3 The extent to which attempts to
influence the government are exempt from the antitrust laws is
determined by the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, a shorthand description of the seminal Supreme Court cases in this area. The precise
basis and limits of this exemption from the antitrust laws, however,
have yet to be unequivocally articulated.
Establishing the scope of this exemption has proven difficult
largely because of the variety of governmental institutions whose
decisions affect private economic interests and the diverse means
that private parties utilize in attempting to influence these institutions. Private anticompetitive ends may be sought, for example, by
lobbying the legislature to enact a statute,4 petitioning the executive
to enforce a law in a certain manner,5 opposing the grant of a license
t J.D., The University of Chicago, 1977. The author would like to thank Professors
Richard Posner, Kenneth Dam, and Geoffrey Stone, who read and helpfully criticized earlier
drafts of this article.
I Section 1 of the Sherman At, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), prohibits "[elvery contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy" in restraint of trade. Section 2
proscribes all attempts and conspiracies to monopolize. While the problems addressed in this
article typically arise when competitors jointly attempt to influence governmental decisionmaking, the analysis is equally applicable to attempts by single firms, which may be held
liable under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
2 The language of the Sherman Act was deliberately drafted in broad terms because it
was felt that particularization might defeat its purpose "by providing loopholes for escape."
Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1932), quoted in Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 599 n.40 (1976).
3 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136
(1960).
E.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1960).
E.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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by an administrative body to a competitor, 6 bringing a lawsuit
against a competitor to reduce competition,7 or urging a governmental unit not to purchase the goods of a competitor.8 Moreover, the
methods employed by private parties to influence governmental action may not be limited to truthful dissemination of information but
may also include deliberate misrepresentations," illegal campaign
contributions, 0 threats," extortion, or bribery. 2 This variety complicates the task of ascertaining the scope of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine because some but not all of these attempts to influence the
government will be protected by the right to petition embodied in3
the first amendment, a right whose boundaries remain uncertain.
Part I of this article will discuss the evolution and present status of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine in the Supreme Court. The
basis and limits of the doctrine will be analyzed in Part II. It will
be argued that the exemption from the antitrust laws established
by the Noerr-Penningtonline of cases is properly limited to activity
protected by the constitutional right to petition. General principles
for determining whether anticompetitive attempts to influence the
government are constitutionally protected will be proposed. Applying these principles, Part III will analyze the "sham" exception to
the Noerr exemption, and Part IV will discuss a miscellany of questions regarding the doctrine that have arisen in the courts.
An important point, but one that is easily lost sight of, is that
the Noerr-Penningtonline of cases concerns the scope of an exemption from the antitrust laws. It must be emphasized at the outset
I E.g.,

California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).

7 E.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).

E.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
1 E.g., Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975); Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
11E.g., Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D. Colo.

1975).
11E.g., Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
12E.g., Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D. Colo.
1975).
13It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and
press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are
inseparable. They are cognate rights. . . and therefore are united in the First Article's
assurance.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). The Court has never specifically and separately
defined the scope of the right to petition. See Annot., 30 L. Ed. 2d 914 (1972).
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that conduct unprotected
by Noerr does not necessarily constitute
4
an antitrust violation.1
I.

A.

THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME COURT

Development of the Doctrine

1. Attempts to Influence Legislative Decisions. The Supreme
Court first considered the interplay between attempts to influence
governmental action and the antitrust laws in Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. ,5 Noerr was the
culmination of a three-decade competitive struggle between railroads and truckers in Pennsylvania. In an attempt to improve their

competitive position, the railroads began a widespread publicity
campaign, directed by a public relations firm, against the trucking
industry. Front organizations supported by the railroads vilified the
truckers. By use of this "third-party technique," the participation
of the railroads in the campaign against the trucking industry was
hidden from the public.
The campaign was highly successful. Not only was adverse public opinion generated against the truckers but a bill which would
have increased the permissible weight limits on highways, thereby
improving the competitive position of the truckers, was vetoed by
the governor of Pennsylvania. The truckers responded by filing an
antitrust action against the railroads. The district court'" found that
the activities of the railroads were fraudulent, malicious, and viola7
tive of the antitrust laws. The Third Circuit affirmed.'
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Black, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that joint attempts to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws are exempt from the Sherman Act. Four arguments were advanced to support this ruling. First, the Court emphasized the "essential dissimilarity"'' 8 between an agreement to lobby
for legislation and the agreements traditionally condemned by the
" This point is forcefully illustrated by two cases involving the same parties. In George
R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 400

U.S. 850 (1970), the First Circuit held that an attempt to influence government purchases
was not exempted from the antitrust laws by Noerr. See text and notes at notes 187-188 infra.

In a later case, however, the First Circuit held that defendant's conduct, even if unprotected
by Noerr, was unfair competition which did not rise to the level of an antitrust violation.
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). The relationship between business torts and the antitrust laws
is beyond the scope of this article.
365 U.S. 127 (1965).
" 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
17273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959).
365 U.S. 127, 136 (1960).
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Sherman Act, such as price-fixing and boycotts. The dissimilarity,
while not "conclusive" on the question of the antitrust laws' applicability, was a "warning" against treating joint lobbying efforts as
an unlawful restraint. 9 Second, the Court stressed that prohibiting
joint lobbying efforts would substantially impair the ability of the
people to make their wishes known to public officials, 2 thus impeding the proper functioning of our democracy. 21 Moreover, applying
the antitrust laws to lobbying efforts "would impute to the Sherman
Act a purpose to regulate, not a business activity, but political
activity .... ,,22 Finally, construing the Sherman Act to reach
lobbying activities "would raise important constitutional questions"' because the right to petition the government is protected by
the first amendment. In a footnote, however, the Court stated that
it was unnecessary to decide whether the railroad's activities were
protected by the first amendment. 24
The Court's reasoning in Noerr is not persuasive. The essential
dissimilarity argument, suggesting that atypical, untraditional,
anticompetitive agreements are not violative of the antitrust laws,
is contrary to prevailing precedent.2 5 On other occasions, moreover,
the Court has held the use of the courts to achieve anticompetitive
ends can violate the antitrust laws, although such conduct is
"essentially dissimilar" to practices traditionally condemned by
the
antitrust laws. 2' The "representative government" argument-that
the Sherman Act regulates business rather than political activity-merely restates the essential dissimilarity argument, which
'1

Id. at 137.

0

Id.

In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Court held that the Sherman Act was
not intended to apply to state action. This state action exemption from the antitrust laws
has been narrowed by recent decisions. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). For a discussion of the relationship
between Cantor and Noerr, see text and notes at notes 69-75 infra.
365 U.S. 127, 137 (1960).
2 Id. at 138.
2,Id. at 132 n.6.
2 See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (It is not
the form of combination or the particular means used but the result which is condemned by
the antitrust laws); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911) (Sherman Act encompasses all acts within its spirit or purpose "without regard to the garb in which
1
such acts were clothed.").
2 E.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965);
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
In the most recent major case dealing with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the Court has
seemingly abandoned the "essential dissimilarity" rationale and has focused exclusively on
the constitutional underpinnings of Noerr. See California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
21
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supposedly was not conclusive.? Nor did the Court explain how
either the right of private parties to inform their representatives or
the ability of government officials to take action restraining trade
would be impaired by the imposition of sanctions against the deceptive and fraudulent conduct of the railroads.
The final reason offered by the Noerr Court, an unwillingness
to "lightly impute to Congress ' 28 an intent to prohibit activity arguably protected by the first amendment, is based on an unduly narrow view of the Sherman Act. The Act, for example, has been applied to prohibit the bringing of certain lawsuits, 9 even though access to the courts is guaranteed by the first amendment.3 The
Court, moreover, has repeatedly stated in other contexts that Congress in enacting the Sherman Act left none of its constitutional
power unexercised. 3' If the lobbying techniques of the railroads were
unprotected by the first amendment, an exemption from the antitrust laws was not warranted. Yet, it was precisely the constitutional question which the Court refused to decide in Noerr even
though the first three grounds advanced for the Court's decision
32
were inconclusive.
11 Note, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 518, 526 (1969); Note, 33 ROCKY MT.L. REV. 413, 415 (1961).
Moreover, it is not clear that the present Supreme Court would draw such a bright line
between political and business activity. Several lower courts, for example, relying on the
language in Noerr that the Sherman Act was only intended to regulate business activity,
created a learned profession exemption to the antitrust laws. E.g., Marjorie Webster Junior
College, Inc., v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650,
654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975), the Court rejected this limitation on the scope of the Sherman Act.
1,365 U.S. at 138.
21 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
837 (1952).
3o E.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
No one has ever contended that the antitrust laws cannot be applied to conduct that
involves speech. As the Supreme Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490 (1949), has stated: "Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of
speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society." Id. at 502. For an early suggestion that condemning certain agreements
under the antitrust laws might infringe freedom of speech, see American Column Co. v.
UnitedStates, 257 U.S. 377, 413 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31E.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
2 Later decisions, however, have viewed Noerr as a first amendment decision. E.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1972). Similarly, some commentators have erroneously asserted that
Noerr held that lobbying activities were protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Note,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 637-38 (1977).
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2. The Extension of Noerr to Attempts to Influence Executive
Action. Noerr held that attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws are exempt from the Sherman Act. The Noerr
Court's reasoning suggested that only political activity is exempted.
33 the Court apparently
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
abandoned this limitation on the Noerr doctrine. In Pennington,
several large mine operators, in cooperation with union officials,
attempted to eliminate the competition of smaller coal producers by
persuading the Secretary of Labor to set a higher minimum wage
for employees of producers selling to the TVA under the WalshHealey Act and by convincing the TVA to purchase coal only from
producers covered by the higher minimum wage provision. The Supreme Court found this activity protected by Noerr: "Joint efforts
to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even
though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act."35
The Pennington opinion is troublesome in several respects. As
in Noerr, the Court did not determine whether the defendants'
immunity from antitrust liability was predicated on the first
amendment or construction of the Sherman Act. A second troubling
aspect.of Pennington is that it apparently extends Noerr to attempts to influence government officials performing purely commercial functions. Exempting the defendants' concerted action to
persuade the Secretary of Labor to set a higher minimum wage from
the antitrust laws was clearly consistent with the rationale of Noerr
because the Walsh-Healey Act conferred discretion on the Secretary
to set wage levels. The policymaking role of the TVA was less obvious. If the TVA made its purchasing decisions to further policy
objectives such as supporting the Secretary's minimum wage policies or fostering regional development, then exempting the defendants' lobbying of the TVA was warranted by Noerr. If, however,
the TVA made its purchasing decisions on purely economic grounds
without regard to policy considerations, Penningtonwas a considerable extension of Noerr. The Court, however, failed to examine the
nature of the TVA's decision or contrast it with the political decisions lobbied for in Noerr. This failure, coupled with the Court's
broad statement of the Noerr exemption, could be interpreted as
broadening Noerr to encompass attempts to influence purely com- 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
- 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
- 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
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mercial government action.
The Court's lack of sensitivity to the possible absence of political activity in Pennington is particularly surprising in light of
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,3 decided
between Noerr and Pennington. In Continental Ore the plaintiff
vanadium producer alleged that an American vanadium producer
and its subsidiary, which served as the wartime purchaser of vanadium products for the Canadian government, conspired with another American producer to eliminate plaintiff from the Canadian
market. Defendants argued that their activities were protected by
Noerr because the subsidiary was acting as purchasing agent for the
Canadian government.3 7 The Court refused, however, to apply or
extend Noerr because the alleged conspiracy involved "private commercial activity, no element of which involved seeking to procure
'38
the passage or enforcement of laws.
The broad language of Pennington is inconsistent with
Continental Ore. It is unlikely, however, that the Court in
Pennington meant to reject both the limiting language of Noerr and
the Continental Ore decision in a case dealing primarily with other
issues.3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's failure in Noerr, and
particularly in Pennington, to indicate the limits of the antitrust
exemption for attempts to influence governmental action has understandably confused the lower courts.'
3. The Extension of Noerr to Attempts to Influence Adjudicative Bodies. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited,4' the Court extended the Noerr exemption to concerted
attempts to influence the courts and administrative adjudicative
bodies. California Motor Transport was a suit for treble damages
and injunctive relief brought by fourteen plaintiffs against nineteen
defendants, all motor carriers subject to regulation by the California
Public Utilities Commission. The complaint alleged that defendants had conspired to monopolize trade in the transportation of
goods by instituting state and federal administrative and judicial
proceedings in opposition to applications by plaintiffs to acquire
motor carrier operating rights in California. These proceedings were
: 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
"
Continental Ore attached no significance to the fact that a foreign government was
involved. On the relationship between Noerr and attempts to influence foreign governments,
see text and notes at notes 202-207 infra.
370 U.S. at 707.
3' The Court was primarily concerned with the labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
41See text and notes at notes 171-211 infra.
41 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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instituted "with or without probable cause, and regardless of the
' 42
merits of the cases.
After the holding of Penningtonthat attempts to influence public officials were exempt from the Sherman Act, it might have appeared a foregone conclusion that the defendants' activities in
California Motor Transport were also exempt. Yet the extent to
which courts and adjudicative bodies could legally be utilized to
attain anticompetitive ends after Penningtonwas far from clear. On
the one hand, several Supreme Court43 and lower court 4 cases had
held that bringing a patent infringement suit could in certain circumstances constitute an antitrust violation. On the other hand, the
Court's holding in NAACP v. Button4 5 that a state could not prevent
the NAACP from providing free counsel for school desegregation
suits consistently with the first amendment suggested that there
might be a constitutional right to jointly petition the courts. Further, the impact of Noerr itself was ambiguous. Attempts to influence the courts, a coordinate branch of government, might appear
to enjoy the same exemption from the antitrust laws as similar
conduct directed toward the other branches of government. But it
could be argued that attempts to influence the courts are not protected by Noerr because courts, unlike the legislature or executive,
do not make or enforce laws but only apply laws and policies established by other branches of government. 6
Without discussing the conflicting precedents, Justice Douglas,
writing for a majority of the Court, 47 quickly dismissed the contention that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was inapplicable to attempts to influence adjudication:
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and petition to hold that groups with common interests
may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels
and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of
Id. at 512.
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965);
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
U E.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
837 (1952); Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938).
- 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
" E.g., Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir.
1970), off'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
11 Justices Stewart and Brennan concurred in the judgment. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist did not participate.
4

'
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their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitor.4
The California Motor Transport Court squarely rested its decision
on the first amendment. The Court did not, however, decide
whether the Noerr-Penningtonexemption is applicable only to conduct protected by the first amendment.
While CaliforniaMotor Transport can therefore be viewed as an
extension of first amendment protection to certain petitioning conduct in the adjudicative context, there is language in the opinion
signaling a retreat from Noerr. Particularly troublesome is a paragraph of the opinion in which Justice Douglas discussed the relationship between the first amendment and the antitrust laws:
"Petitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies and
courts . . . . That right, as indicated, is part of the right of petition
protected by the First Amendment. Yet that does not necessarilly
give them immunity from the antitrust laws." 49 This language is
impossible to reconcile with the statement earlier in the Court's
opinion that petitioning the courts, even with an anticompetitive
purpose, is protected by the first amendment.- Moreover, this aspect of California Motor Transport is also flatly inconsistent with
Noerr, which held that lobbying is exempt from the antitrust laws.
As Justice Stewart stated in his concurring opinion: "Today the
Court retreats from Noerr, and in the process tramples upon important First Amendment values . . . . [Noerr] explicitly held . . .
right of petition is given
that the joint exercise of the constitutional
' '5
immunity from the antitrust laws. 1
It is unlikely, however, that Justice Douglas intended to limit
Noerr in a case where the Court extended Noerr to attempts to
influence adjudicatory bodies. Nor have subsequent cases interpreted CaliforniaMotor Transport as limiting Noerr. Nevertheless,
it is conceivable that future cases could seize on ambiguous language in CaliforniaMotor Transportas a rationale for narrowing the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.
B.

Present Vitality of the Doctrine

While California Motor Transport is the last major Supreme
Court case to interpret the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the doc404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
4, Id. at 513.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 516-17.
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trine's continued vitality has been called into question by the recent
case of Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 2
1. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. Detroit Edison, a private utility pervasively regulated by the Michigan Public Service Commission, has long been the sole supplier of electricity in southeastern
Michigan. The utility also furnished its residential customers with
free light bulbs. This practice, begun long before state regulation of
electric utilities had become part of the utility's rate structure,
could not be changed unless a new tariff was filed with and approved by the Commission. Cantor, a retail druggist who sold light
bulbs, brought an antitrust action against Detroit Edison, alleging
that Edison was using its monopoly power in the distribution of
electricity to restrain competition in the light bulb market. Relying
on Parkerv. Brown,53 in which the Supreme Court held that a stateimposed monopoly was beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, the
district court" and the Sixth Circuit 5 both held that the Commission's approval of the tariff was sufficient state action to exempt the
light bulb program.
The Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion of the Court, and five Justices joined in Parts I and Ill of
his opinion, the parts most relevant to Noerr.6 In Part I, Justice
Stevens noted that while the light bulb program was regulated, the
primary function of the Commission was to regulate electricity and
neither the Michigan legislature nor the Commission had ever specifically investigated the utility's practice of furnishing light bulbs
to its residential customers. Therefore, the opinion reasoned, the
state's policy was "neutral" regarding the desirability of Detroit
Edison's light bulb program. 7
In Part III, Justice Stevens discussed the two possible justifications for exempting private conduct regulated by state law from the
Sherman Act: (1) that it would be unjust to subject to antitrust
428 U.S. 579 (1976).
317 U.S. 341 (1942).
51 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 428
U.S. 579 (1976).
- 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
11 Only four justices joined in the other two parts of Stevens' opinion. In Part II, Justice
Stevens stated that the state action exemption of Parker v. Brown was limited to official
action taken by state officials. As Detroit Edison was not a state official, Parker was found
inapposite. 428 U.S. at 589-92. In the final part of his opinion, Justice Stevens rejected Detroit
Edison's claim that imposition of antitrust liability would be unjust because the utility had
justifiably understood prior precedents to hold regulated conduct to be immune from antitrust liability and state regulation had increased the company's risk of violating the antitrust
laws. Id. at 598-603.
1, 428 U.S. at 584.
32

53
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liability a private citizen who has done nothing but obey the state's
command; and (2) that Congress did not intend to superimpose the
antitrust laws as an additional, and perhaps conflicting, regulatory
mechanism in areas regulated by state law. The unfairness justification was dismissed because the light bulb program was initiated
years before the regulatory agency was created and the option to
continue the light bulb program belonged primarily to Detroit Edison, not the Commission. Thus, the facts in Cantorwere similar to
other cases involving "a blend of private and public decisionmaking,"5 where "notwithstanding the state participation in the decision, the private party exercised sufficient freedom of choice to enable the Court to conclude that he should be held responsible for the
consequences of his decision." 59
The second possible ground for immunizing private conduct
required by state law-that Congress did not intend to impose antitrust standards on conduct already regulated by state law-was also
rejected, for three reasons. First, the Court stressed that concurrent
federal and state regulation did not necessarily mean that private
conduct would be governed by inconsistent standards. Indeed, there
was no necessary conflict between state regulation of the natural
monopoly of electricity distribution and federal regulation of the
competitive market in light bulbs." Second, federal interests should
not automatically be subordinated to those of the states when state
regulations and federal antitrust law conflict. A state regulation
should give rise to an antitrust exemption only if "necessary in order
to make the regulatory act work.""1 Since Michigan's regulation of
electricity was not dependent on regulation of the light bulb program, federal interests predominated. Finally, the Court stated that
even if Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to areas
pervasively regulated by a state, the antitrust laws could still oper- Id. at 592.
' Id. at 593.
Id. at 595-96.
61 Id. at 597. This aspect of Cantor is significant because the Court for the first time
applied the implied repeal doctrine, developed in precedents involving conflicts between
federal regulation and federal antitrust policy, see, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exch.,
422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), to the situation
where state regulation is arguably in conflict with federal antitrust policy. In cases of possible
conflict between federal regulatory policy and federal antitrust policy, the Court has repeatedly stated that "[riepeal [of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied only if
necessary to make the . . . [Act] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary." 418 U.S. at 596 n.34 (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 391
(1973), (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963))).
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ate in essentially unregulated markets such as the light bulb market. 2
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun wrote concurring
opinions. To the Chief Justice the key fact was the state's lack of
"independent regulatory purpose" 3 in controlling the distribution
of light bulbs. Justice Blackmun, concurring with the majority in
the result only, fashioned a balancing test to determine when state
programs are preempted by federal antitrust law.64 Justice Blackmun found Michigan's interest in regulating the distribution of light
bulbs by utilities outweighed by the federal interest in promoting
65
competition in the generally unregulated light bulb market.
Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
filed a vigorous dissent. In their view, the Court's conclusion that it
would not be unjust to impose antitrust liability on Detroit Edison
because the utility participated in the decision to implement and
continue the light bulb program "would effectively overrule . . .
Noerr."66 Not only would the right to petition be penalized, but the
effectiveness of state regulation would be severely hampered were
regulatory bodies thus deprived of valuable sources of information. 7
The dissent also criticized the Court's attempt to determine
whether Congress intended to impose antitrust standards on conduct already regulated under state law. This process, said the dissent, represented no more than an ad hoc judgment of the substantive validity of state regulatory goals and was closely akin to the
"discarded doctrine of substantive due process." 8
2. The Impact of Cantor on the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
It should be emphasized that the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine was
not briefed, argued, or at issue in Cantor.Noerr involved concerted
lobbying activities, not private action taken in compliance with
state law. 9 Nevertheless, petitioning the government would be inhibited if antitrust liability could result from acting in compliance
with the governmental action sought. Moreover, the broad language
of the plurality opinion regarding the importance of "initiation" and
62

428 U.S. at 595.

a

Id. at 604.
Id. at 605-14.

, Id. at 612-14.
" Id. at 616.
, Id. at 627.
Id.
" In many cases of attempts to influence the government, the issue of liability for acting
in compliance with the governmental action sought will not arise. If, for example, a competitor succeeds in convincing an agency not to certify a new entrant, the competitor need take
no further action.
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"freedom of choice" in determining the "fairness" of imposing antiplausibility to the dissent's view that Noerr has
trust liability lends
70
been eviscerated.
Other aspects of the Court's opinion, however, indicate that
Noerr has not been significantly disturbed. Two crucial findings
distinguish Cantorfrom the typical Noerr case in which exercise of
the right to petition results in governmental action: (1) the light
bulb program had existed long before the state regulatory scheme
was enacted; and (2) the state had no policy concerning the desirability of the light bulb program. Bearing these findings in mind,
Cantorshould be narrowly interpreted to mean that a private party
may not shield himself from antitrust liability by having a regulatory body rubber-stamp a tariff which includes a report or a description of an anticompetitive activity. Thus, Cantordoes not undercut
Noerr, but rather represents a realistic assessment of the regulatory
process. As the Court stated:
[N]othing in the Noerr opinion implies that the mere fact that
a state regulatory agency may approve a proposal included in
a tariff, and thereby require that the proposal be implemented
until a revised tariff is filed and approved, is a sufficient reason
for conferring antitrust immunity on the proposed conduct
71

No exemption from the antitrust laws was appropriate in Cantor,
therefore, because private commercial conduct is not transformed
into state action by filing a tariff with an unsuspecting state regulatory agency. 72 A different case would be presented, however, if a
"'

If the view of the dissent were correct, California Motor Transport would also be
overruled, since a party who files a lawsuit or commences an agency proceeding has clearly
taken the initiative.
11428 U.S. at 601-02.
72 This interpretation of Cantoris supported by the recent case of Bates v. State Bar, 97
S. Ct. 2691 (1977). In Bates, a disciplinary rule adopted by the state Supreme Court that
prohibited advertising by attorneys was challenged as violative of the Sherman Act and the
first amendment. The bar association contended that the disciplinary rules were exempt from
the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown. Plaintiffs, relying on
Cantor, contended that no immunity was appropriate because the rules were derived from
the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association rather than from the
unilateral action of state officials. The Court, however, refused to read Cantor so broadly,
stating that the context in which the case arose was "crucial" to its understanding. Not only
did Cantor involve a suit against a private party rather than state officials, but also the state
had no independent regulatory interest in the light bulb market. Moreover, the light bulb
program in Cantor was instigated by the utility with only the acquiescence of the state
regulatory commission. The state disciplinary rules, by contrast, "reflect a clear articulation
of the State's policy." 97 S. Ct. at 2698. Having thus distinguished Cantor, the Court held
that the disciplinary rules were exempt from the Sherman Act. The Court went on to hold
the rules violative of the first amendment.
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private party instituted a particular practice only after it had been
investigated and authorized by a state regulatory body. If, for example, both Cantor and Detroit Edison had filed briefs on the desirability of the light bulb program and the Commission had approved
it in a contested proceeding, implementation of the program would
likely be protected under Parker, even though Detroit Edison took
73
the "initiative" in filing the tariff.
The second tier of the Court's test in Cantor for determining
when private conduct required by state law should be immune from
antitrust liability-determining whether Congress intended to impose the antitrust laws as an additional regulatory mechanism in an
area regulated by state law-also has implications for Noerr. While
Justice Stevens apparently intended this test to come into play only
when it would not be "unfair" to impose liability on a private
party, 74 this qualification is unsound. If a non-essential aspect of a
state regulatory scheme is repugnant to the Sherman Act, it should
not be allowed to stand even if it would be unfair to impose liability
on private parties complying with the state regulations. The unfairness in providing private parties with the choice of flouting state lav
or incurring antitrust liability could, as Justice Blackmun suggested, be substantially eliminated by recognizing compliance with
state law as a defense to a treble damage action but not to a suit
for injunctive relief. 75 Exercise of the right to petition the government embodied in the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine would not be substantially inhibited by the possibility that a court might enter an
injunction against complying with state law. The possibility of federal preemption will, however, lessen to some degree the incentives
to expend resources to achieve state action that restrains trade.
Read in context, therefore, Cantor does not significantly affect
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Cantor deals with liability for
71As Justice Blackmun stated, basing antitrust liability on whether a state-sanctioned
scheme was initiated by private actors rather than the state would be virtually impossible to
apply, since the regulatory process involves a "complex interplay between those regulating
and those regulated," making it "impossible to identify the true 'initiator.'" 428 U.S. at 610.
11Justice Stevens never explicitly stated whether this second arm of the test for determining when private conduct required by state law is exempt from the antitrust laws need
be dealt with if the regulated private party did not initiate the state scheme. Rather, Justice
Stevens assumed arguendo that "it would be unacceptable ever to impose statutory liability
on a party who had done nothing more than obey a state command." 428 U.S. at 590. The
dissent assumed, on the contrary, that the second tier of the Stevens test became relevant
only if the private party did not exercise sufficient freedom of choice to hold him responsible
for his actions. Id. at 627.
" Id. at 614-15 n.6. For a discussion of a possible privilege defense for acting in conformity with state law, see Posner, The Proper Relationship between State Regulation and the
FederalAntitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 693, 728-32 (1974).
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complying with state law, not with liability for petitioning the government. While exercise of the right to petition would be greatly
discouraged if liability for damages could result from complying
with the governmental action sought, such liability should not attach if a regulatory body makes a policy determination to sanction
a particular anticompetitive practice. In the event that a regulatory
policy is struck down as repugnant to the antitrust laws, only injunctive relief should be allowed.

II. THE
A.

BASIS OF THE

Noerr-PenningtonDOCTRINE

Statutory Construction or the First Amendment?

The principal weakness of the Noerr-Penningtonline of cases
is the Court's failure to unambiguously articulate the basis for exempting certain lobbying from the reach of the antitrust laws. Noerr
suggests that the exemption: is based on construction of the Sherman Act."8 CaliforniaMotor Transport indicates that the exemption
is predicated upon the first amendment." The resolution of this
ambiguity is crucial, for if all lobbying activities are exempt from
the Sherman Act, conduct that is unprotected by the first amendment might nevertheless be immune from the antitrust laws."
The statutory cqnstruction arguments advanced by the Court
in Noerr have already been considered and dismissed. 79 Two other
possible justifications for holding all lobbying activity, whether or
not constitutionally protected, to be beyond the purview of the antitrust laws deserve mention..
It might be argued that construing the Sherman Act to reach
any lobbying activity would conflict with the doctrine of Parker v.
Brown."0 Parker held that the Sherman Act was not designed to
prohibit state-imposed monopolies. Noerr's holding that attempts
to influence government action are exempt from the antitrust laws
might seem a natural exterision of Parker. If state action is not
illegal under the antitrust laws, the argument goes, attempts to
procure such action should not be subject to antitrust liability ei8
ther. 1
71 365 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1960).

- 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
78 See, e.g., Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Colo. 1975) (holding that illegal lobbying tactics are irrelevant for purposes of the Sherman
Act because the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine is based on statutory construction of the Sherman

Act).

1

7'See text and notes at notes 18-32 supra.
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
81See Baker, Exchange of Information for Presentationto Government Agencies: The
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This argument is unconvincing for several reasons. First,
Parker may be applicable only to suits attacking official action
taken by state officials, and not to suits against private individuals.12 Second, Cantor makes clear that the Parker exemption does
not immunize all anticompetitive private actions taken in compliance with state regulations. Indeed, Cantor suggests that if private
parties are responsible for state regulations requiring anticompetitive actions, Parker immunity may be lost. 3 Third, it is not at all
clear that if a governmental act is legal, all attempts to procure that
act are automatically legal.8 4 In several cases, for example, courts
have upheld antitrust attacks against concerted efforts to influence
ratemaking by administrative agencies even though the validity of
the established rates was not challenged. 5 Finally, the analogy to
Parker has little force when improper means are used. The advantage of immunizing attempts to influence governmental action
when the state action itself is exempt is that government officials
will be able to make decisions which restrain trade more effectively
if they have adequate sources of information. But this interest is
satisfied by exempting attempts to influence the government by
means protected by the first amendment.
Another argument for exempting all lobbying activities from
the scope of the antitrust laws is that selective use of the Sherman
Act would be an "irrational, piecemeal way of regulating lobbying
abuses." 8 After all, lobbying abuses are not confined to anticompetitive attempts to secure governmental action. This argument, like
the Court's concern in Noerr about using the Sherman Act as a code
of ethics for political activity, misses the point. The Sherman Act
is not invoked in cases of anticompetitive attempts to influence the
government as a substitute for direct regulation of lobbying abuses,
but as a separate statutory mechanism with different purposes and
remedies. The existence or non-existence of direct regulation for
lobbying abuses, whether or not anticompetitive in effect, is irrelevant for determining antitrust liability.
The justifications for basing the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine on
Interplay of the Container and Noerr Doctrines, 44 ANerrRusT L.J. 354 (1975).
"ZCompare Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 591 (1976) (opinion of Stevens,
J.), with Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2698 (1977).
See note 74 supra.
See Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R.R., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).
E.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
See Costillo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MiCH.
L. REv. 333, 348 (1967).
" Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Government Action,
81 HARV. L. REV.847, 850 (1968).
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construction of the antitrust laws have been examined and found
wanting. While the Supreme Court has not expressly disavowed the
statutory construction bases for the Noerr exemption, the Court's
most recent interpretation of the exemption is incompatible with
the view that the Sherman Act does not apply to attempts to influence the government. In California Motor Transport7 the Court
indicated that misrepresentations, bribery, and perjury, at least in
the adjudicative context, may give rise to antitrust liability-even
though such conduct may well be intended to influence the government.8 8 If resort to the courts in certain circumstances can constitute an antitrust violation, it is difficult to see why resort to the
legislative or executive branches should enjoy a blanket statutory
exemption."
B. The Right to Petition: Supreme Court Pronouncements
The first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
abridging the right of the people "to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."" Although this right has been described as
"among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill
of Rights,"'" it has seldom been interpreted by the Court.
1. The Right to Petition the Courts. In a series of cases the
Court struck down statutes that prohibited individuals from associating for the purpose of recommending or providing lawyers to
persons with legal claims-in particular, victims of racial discrimi404 U.S. 508 (1972).
Id. at 512-13.
"
Lower court cases which have held that abusive lobbying tactics are protected under
Noerr have relied on the statutory construction justification. See, e.g., Cow Palace, Ltd. v.
Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D. Colo. 1975); Schenley Indus., Inc. v.
New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967) (both holding
that illegal lobbying tactics are irrelevant for purposes of the Sherman Act). But cf. Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971), where the court noted, "[I]t does not seem to this Court that
the doctrines of Noerr and Pennington were intended to protect those who employ illegal
means to influence their representatives in government." Id. at 1099.
Some commentators have asserted that cases such as Sacramento "conflict with Noerr,
in which the Supreme Court concluded that deliberate deception of public officials, reprehensible as it may be, is of no Sherman Act consequence." Rill & Frank, Antitrust Consequences
of United States CorporatePayments to Foreign Officials: Applicability of Section 2(c) of the
Robinson-PatmanAct and Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act, 30 VmD. L. REv. 131, 151
(1977). While the broad language in Noerr lends some support to this contention, it must be
emphasized that later cases such as CaliforniaMotor Transport have interpreted Noerr as
resting on the first amendment. Under first amendment law, Sacramento is entirely consistent with Noerr.
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
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nation and injured workers.92
The seminal case on the constitutional right of access to the
3 where the Court struck down a
courts is NAACP v. Button,"
Virginia statute which prohibited NAACP members from associating
for the purpose of assisting persons in racial discrimination matters.
Button could have been viewed as a precedent of narrow applicability; the whole tenor of the Court's opinion is one of sympathy for
the plight of minority citizens for whom "litigation may well be the
sole practicable avenue open. . for redress of grievances." 94 Moreover, the Court was careful to distinguish resort to the courts for
political purposes such as the vindication of constitutional rights
from the "oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely private gain." 5 Later cases interpreting Button, however, expanded the right of access to the courts to situations involving the promotion of economic interests rather than the vindication
of constitutional rights.98 In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia State Bar,9" for example, the Court specifically rejected the
contention that Button could be limited to cases involving political
expression. The Button-Railroad Trainmen line of cases was
summed up by Mr. Justice Black in United TransportationUnion
v. State Bar: "The common thread running through our decisions
• . .is that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the
First Amendment."98 As this statement suggests, these decisions
primarily rested on the first amendment's guarantee of associational
freedom but also alluded to the due process right of access to the
courts.9
Adopting a slightly different view, the Court in California
Motor Transport declared that the right of access to the courts is
but an aspect of the right to petition.1 1 To hold that groups violate
2 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 425 (1963).
'3 371 U.S. 425 (1963).
" Id. at 430.
" Id. at 443.
" E.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
17377 U.S. 1 (1964).
401 U.S. at 585.
' The source of the constitutional right of access to the courts was long shrouded in
uncertainty. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)); Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546
(1941). The Court has recently explained that the right of access to the courts is founded on
the due process clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). See also Bounds v.
Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977).
404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex Parte Hull,

The University of Chicago Law Review

[45:80

the antitrust laws by resorting to courts and administrative agencies
to "advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution
of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors," said the Court, "would be destructive of rights of association
and petition . ..."I
The Court's extension of the right to petition to adjudicatory
bodies in California Motor Transport was clearly correct. The first
amendment right to petition should extend to all branches of government. The right to petition serves two important values. First,
it ensures that citizens can present grievances to their government.
The nature of the grievance determines which governmental agency
is petitioned, but the right of the people to present their claims
remains uniformly important. 02 Second, the right to petition helps
ensure that the government is informed. 03 Courts, like administrative bodies, legislatures and executive agencies, are dependent on
interested parties for much information. It might be argued that
courts are dependent upon the parties to supply only "adjudicative"
facts while policymakers need instruction regarding "legislative"
facts from interested individuals." 4 But the first amendment draws
no such distinction, and, in any event, administrative agencies and
courts, particularly higher ones like the Supreme Court, exercise
considerable policymaking power. 0 5
2. The Right to Petition the Legislature and Executive. The
Court has never clearly articulated the limits of the right to petition
the legislature and executive.' 6 The Court has indicated that the
right to petition adjudicatory bodies does not protect abusive practices,'07 but the scope of the right to petition non-adjudicatory government bodies is shrouded in uncertainty.
312 U.S. 546 (1941)).
01 404 U.S. at 510-11 (emphasis added).
002 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
" See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 363 U.S. 127
(1961).
I" See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 160 (1972). The nature of the facts determining a legal dispute may control whether a trial-type procedure is required by due process.
Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), with Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
,05
This is not to suggest, however, that conduct protected in the political arena is necessarily protected in the adjudicative. For example, an interested party would be permitted to
mail a letter to a legislator expressing his views, but a similar attempt to communicate ex
parte with a juror would be impermissible.
10 In two earlier cases, the Court had construed the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act,
2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1970), to avoid tensions with the first amendment right to petition.
See United States v. Harriss, 347 -U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41
(1953).
"I,
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1972).
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Language in CaliforniaMotor Transportsuggests that unethical conduct enjoys more constitutional protection in the political
arena. After taking note of a statement in Noerr that the unethical
nature of the defendants' activities was irrelevant to determining
Sherman Act liability, ,18 the Court distinguished the effect of unethical conduct in the adjudicative context:
[Unethical conduct in the setting of the adjudicatory process
often results in sanctions. Perjury of witnesses is one example.
Use of a patent obtained by fraud to exclude a competitor from
the market may involve a violation of the antitrust laws ....
[B]ribery of a public purchasing agent may constitute a violation ....
There are other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice
which may corrupt administrative or judicial processes and
which may result in antitrust violation. Misrepresentations,
condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used
in the adjudicatory process .... "I
This passage is troublesome in several respects. First, the implication of Justice Douglas's opinion that unethical practices are
only subject to sanction in an adjudicative setting is simply incorrect. Perjury and bribery are prohibited in both the legislative and
adjudicative contexts." ' Misrepresentations, as well as other reprehensible tactics, have also been subjected to regulation and prohibition in the political arena.' Thus, even if the Court was correct in
gauging the scope of the right to petition by the existence of sanctions for the general type of activity involved, the Court's distinction between the level of protection afforded conduct in the adjudicatory context and that afforded lobbying is unsupported. A second
365 U.S. at 140-42.
'" Id. at 512-13. The concurring opinion adopted this same dichotomy between unethical

practices in the political and adjudicatory arenas: "The difference in type of governmental
body might make a difference in the applicability of the antitrust laws if the petitioners had
made misrepresentations of fact or law to these tribunals, or had engaged in perjury, or fraud,
or bribery." Id. at 517.
"' See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) (imposing criminal penalities for bribery or attempted
bribery of federal officials); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970) (imposing criminal penalties for knowingly and willfully concealing or misrepresenting material facts before any department or
agency of the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970) (imposing criminal penalties for perjury
before a competent tribunal of the United States).
"I See Developments in the Law-Elections,88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1272-98 (1975). In a
recent case which was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, a three-judge district court
stated that a statute regulating deceptive campaign speech by political candidates would be
constitutional if it incorporated the New York Times actual malice standard. Vanasco v.
Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
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problem is the Court's failure to explain why the independent
legality vel non of a course of conduct should determine whether
it is protected by the right to petition. That behavior is prohibited
is perhaps evidence that it is unprotected by the first amendment.
But the converse is not true-activity is not protected by the first
amendment because it has not been specifically prohibited or
penalized. Thus, the Court in CaliforniaMotor Transportfailed to
adequately explain why the unethical nature of petitioning activity
should be relevant to the scope of first amendment protectionand specifically to the scope of an antitrust exemption-in the
adjudicatory context, but, as Noerr suggested, irrelevant to the
protection of speech in the political arena.
C.

A General Framework

The California Motor Transport opinion established that the
Noerr doctrine is based on the first amendment rights of petition
and association.12 Furthermore, it has been argued that there is no
rationale for fashioning an exemption from the antitrust laws for
lobbying activity broader than that required by the first amendment.13 But a principled basis for ascertaining the scope of the first
amendment right to petition the government to take anticompetitive action has never been articulated. Almost all Supreme Court
cases referring to the right to petition do not analyze this right
separately from the cognate first amendment rights of assembly,
association, and speech." 4 It would be sensible to employ first
amendment principles developed in free speech cases to guide application of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. This appropriation of principles is justified because the values promoted by the first amendment free speech guaranty and those advanced by the Noerr
doctrine are very similar.
A primary purpose of freedom of speech is to ensure that the
electorate has the information necessary to properly discharge its
self-governing responsibilities."' The right to petition the government is a necessary adjunct to freedom of speech under the first
amendment qua guarantor of informed self-government because
most important public questions are resolved by representatives in
government, not plebiscites. The Noerr doctrine preserves the rights
of businessmen to press the government for resolution of certain
2 404 U.S. at 510.
m See text and notes at notes 18-31, 79-89 supra.
m See note 13 supra.
" See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 H~Av. L. REv. 1 (1965);
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. Rlv. 191.
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legal, economic, and social problems. This advocacy properly includes presentation of facts and opinions. It does not include deliberately false statements of fact because presentation of falsehoods
to government officials does not promote well-considered and wellfounded decisions.
Of course, the right to petition does more than ensure that
government officials are apprised of the opinions held and the facts
known by the citizenry. It also promotes confidence that the government is accessible and answerable to the people. That the petitioning activity is of no value to the government does not mean that the
petitioning is of no legitimate value to the petitioner and his cocitizens. Moreover, when recognized standards dictate a particular
governmental decision, as is often the case in the judicial arena, the
petitioner may have an important interest in-a right to-the indicated decision.
On the other hand, a petitioner's psychic interest in prosecuting
a patently frivolous claim or lying to a government agency is insufficiently important to warrant exempting such conduct from the antitrust laws. Indeed, construing the right to petition to protect deliberate misrepresentations and baseless claims not presented in good
faith would devalue the first amendment right to petition. The people, acting through their representatives, have decided that, as a
general rule, competition is to be promoted through the antitrust
laws. Protecting deliberate misrepresentations to government officials which result in harm to competition, for example, would subvert the government's decision to promote competition, a decision
that is the consequence of genuine exercise of the right to petition.
The Supreme Court has declared that there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact. ' Similarly, the Court has ruled
that prosecution of a baseless claim in an adjudicative setting is not
worthy of constitutional protection for its own sake.' These positions are easily reconciliable with the language of the first amendment guaranteeing the right to petition because in these situations
there are no "grievances" to redress. It is necessary, however, to
protect some false statements and baseless claims in order to avoid
inhibiting valuable petitioning.' As in the free speech context, spel' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401
F. Supp. 87, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). This was not always the Court's
view. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279 n.19 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
' Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
' The approach of the lower courts has been to base the decision of whether deliberate
misrepresentations are protected by the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine on the type of governmen-
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cial protective rules are required.
In libel law it is well-established that a public figure may constitutionally recover only by clear and convincing proof that the
defendant's false and defamatory statement was made with actual
malice-that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth."' This standard of care could perhaps be used to
define the limits of speech protection in the Noerr context.," It
might be thought that the knowing or reckless falsehood standard
is overprotective of first amendment values in the Noerr context. In
a series of cases holding that commercial speech is protected by the
first amendment, the Court has reserved the question whether false
or deceptive commercial speech may be more rigorously regulated
than false speech outside the commercial context. The doctrinal
bases for this reservation are that commercial speech is more easily
verified than political speech and that commercial speech is hardier
than political speech because of the financial incentives to advertise. 2' The latter rationale might seem to be applicable to attempts
to influence the government to take anticompetitive action. But it
is doubtful that such activity is as durable as advertising-the paradigmatic form of commercial speech. Often the risk of treble damage liability will outweigh the expectation of returns from petitiontal'body involved. Compare Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (deliberate filing of false
forecasts with adjudicatory body unprotected by Noerr), with Metro Cable Co. v. City of
Rockford, 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975) (deliberate misrepresentations made to City Council
which allegedly resulted in the denial of a cable television franchise protected under Noerr
because the Council was a legislative rather than an adjudicatory body), and Franchise
Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd., 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1571 (1977) (holding that the dissemination of maliciously false
material through the media falls within the scope of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine). Once
it is recognized that the Noerr doctrine rests on the first amendment, deliberately false
statements should not be protected. See text and note at note 116 supra; text and notes at
notes 124-129 infra.
-' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
i0 Only one case has considered the relationship between the New York Times actual
malice standard and Noerr. In Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the
court rejected the New York Times standard in a civil suit seeking to recover damages caused
by the exercise of the right of petition in favor of the broader protection of Noerr. Cf. United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 635 (1954) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that the first
amendment protects the right to petition the government even if the effect of the exercise of
this right is "deceiving and corrupting").
121 Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2708-09 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc v. Town of Willingboro, 97 S. Ct. 1614, 1618
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771-72 & n.24 (1976). For the same reasons, the overbreadth doctrine, which is an
exception to conventional standing principles based on the fragility of speech, does not apply
in commercial speech cases. Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2707-08 (1977).
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ing activity. The objectivity rationale is more clearly inapplicable.
Because such petitioning may involve many types of statements
made in a variety of situations, no generalizations about the verifiability of such speech can be safely made.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the knowing or reckless falsehood standard is insufficiently protective of first amendment values in the Noerr context. To the extent that the standard
represents an accommodation between society's interest in free debate and its interest in protecting the reputations of its citizens, it
could be argued that false statements should be unconditionally
privileged since the reputation interest is generally absent in the
lobbying area. 22 The dangers of false speech, moreover, are noticeably greater in the typical libel situation, where the harm to the
individual occurs at the time of the statement and where there is
no opportunity for effective counter-speech. In the lobbying context,
by contrast, the harm resulting from false speech does not occur
until it has been acted upon by a government official. Typically
competitors have ample opportunity to rebut any false claims and
present their own views. It may be, therefore, that unfettered interchange in the "marketplace of ideas"'213 provides an adequate safeguard against the harmful effects of the false statements in the
course of lobbying.
Nevertheless, recent developments in the regulation of speech
in election campaigns suggest that the "knowing or reckless" falsehood standard is sufficiently protective of first amendment interests
in the area of lobbying activity. Many states now have statutes
regulating deceptive campaign speech. 124 Most of these statutes
cover any false statement concerning any candidate. 25 Typically,
sanctions include criminal penalties of fine or imprisonment.1 2 In a
recent case, which was summarily affirmed by the Supreme
Court,' 27 a three-judge court stated that one such statute regulating
deceptive campaign speech by political candidates would be constitutional if the statute incorporated the knowing or reckless falsehood standard.128 Since election campaigns provide the classic example of "no holds barred" interchange where the law has traditionally assumed that the "marketplace of ideas" would adequately
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1973).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
121See Elections, supra note 111, at 1272-74.
'2

'2

See Id. at 1273.
121
See Id. at 1274.
127Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. at 1041 (1976).
12 401 F. Supp. at 92.
"=
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protect against false speech, it is unlikely that false speech would
enjoy greater first amendment protection under the guise of the
right to petition.' 9
III.

THE "SHAM"

EXCEPTION

The Court has consistently held that the exemption from the
antitrust laws for attempts to influence the government is inapplicable when such conduct is a "sham." The determination of whether
petitioning activity is a sham, however, has been plagued by considerable confusion.
A.

Sham Attempts to Influence Legislative and Executive Bodies

Although the Court in Noerr held that attempts to influence the
passage or enforcement of laws were exempt from the Sherman Act,
it added in dictum:"There may be situations in which a publicity
campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."' 3 °Noerr did not present an occasion for applying the sham
exception because "[n]o one denies that the railroads were making
a genuine effort to influence legislation and law enforcement practices."' ' The injury suffered by the plaintiff truckers was just an
"incidental effect of the railroads' campaign to influence govern' 32
mental action.'
The parameters of the sham exception announced in Noerr are
unclear. One difficulty arises from the Court's equation of attempts
"to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor" with activity not genuinely intended to influence the government. This equation is simply inaccurate. If, for example, a group
of competitors, in order to facilitate a price-fixing arrangement,
exchange information under the cover of a sham lobbying campaign,
this would not directly interfere with the business relationships of
a competitor yet it would constitute a spurious attempt to influence
"I9
It could be argued that application of the antitrust laws to speech is a matter quite
different from the application of election laws because the Sherman Act is so broadly worded.
There is no constitutional infirmity, however, in applying a generally worded statute to
unprotected speech. See, e.g., Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
'
365 U.S. at 144.
"' Id. at 144.
132 Id.

at 143.
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the government.13 It is likely that the Court did not intend to limit
the sham exception to attempts to directly interfere with the business relationships of a competitor. The troublesome language was
probably meant to be illustrative, not definitional. The Court was
primarily concerned in Noerr that the Sherman Act not be used to
regulate or penalize attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws. Construing the sham exception as enunciated in Noerr
to include all activity not genuinely designed to influence the government is more consonant with the Court's central ruling.
In hindsight, the sham exception announced in Noerr suffers a
more fundamental defect. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, it has
been argued, should exempt only activity protected by the first
amendment from antitrust liability. The sham exception as defined
in Noerr brings petitioning activity which is not genuinely designed
to influence the government within the purview of the antitrust
laws. So defined, the sham exception is both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive. On the one hand, petitioning which is not genuinely intended to influence the government may be of constitutional
value. For example, suppose that a businessman accurately presents important facts to a government agency, intending that the
disclosure harm a competitor's business by provoking an adverse
public reaction, but not intending that the government act on the
information he provides. Both the government and the public
should be entitled to the information regardless of the businessman's intentions. This is just an illustration of the principle that
valuable speech is not deprived of first amendment protection by
I" This example raises the problem of the relationship between the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine and the rule of United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969),
which prohibits exchanges of information among competitors in certain circumstances. See
generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTRuST 265-74 (1976).
Competitors will often collect and disseminate information in preparation for petitioning
the government. Cumulative price and sales data, for example, may be necessary for lobbying
before legislatures, executives, or presentation to government agencies. If the dissemination
of such information would not be illegal under ContainerCorp., no problem arises. A conflict
between Noerr and Container does arise, however, if an exchange of information would be
illegal under Container, but, at the same time, is necessary for a legitimate presentation to
the government. Since no court has ever had to face this conflict, its resolution is uncertain.
Cf. I.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 1976 Trade Cases T 60,964 (N.D.
Tex. 1976) (possible conflict between Noerr and ContainerCorp. suggested). An exchange of
information should be protected under Noerr if it is necessary to, and made for the purpose
of, genuinely attempting to influence government action. However, if competitors agree to
adhere to a price schedule after an exchange of information and then attempt to immunize
themselves by simply forwarding this information to the government, the price-fixing agreement would not be protected by the Noerr doctrine. Cf. Commerce Tankers v. Nat'l Maritime
U. of America, 553 F.2d 793, 800 (2d Cir. 1977) (an illegal group boycott cannot be immunized
by the bringing of a lawsuit to enforce it).
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the speaker's improper motive.' 34 On the other hand, all speech and
activity which is intended to influence the government does not
warrant first amendment protection. Bribery' 35 and perjury'35 are
obvious examples.
Thus, the sham exception announced in Noerr is inconsistent
with the first amendment basis of the Noerr-Penningtonexemption.
The sham exception should be reinterpreted to encompass all petitioning activity which is unprotected by the first amendment.
B.

Sham Attempts to Influence Adjudicative Bodies

The complaint in California Motor Transportalleged that the
defendants conspired to monopolize trade in the transportation of
goods by opposing, with or without probable cause, the plaintiffs'
applications to obtain motor carrier operating rights in California.
The alleged purposes of the conspiracy were to eliminate existing
and potential competition and to deny plaintiffs "free and unlimited" access to the tribunals which regulated the highway common
carrier business in California. The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action, relying on a statement in Pennington that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a
concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or
purpose.1' 37 The Court held that the complaint stated a cause of
action within the sham exception to Noerr because of the allegations
that the conspirators were not genuinely intent upon influencing
public officials but upon harassing the plaintiffs. '
It will be recalled that the Court in CaliforniaMotor Transport
emphasized that unethical conduct, often condoned in the political
context, might not be condoned in the adjudicatory context. Some
courts'39 and commentators, 40 relying on this language, have argued
that unethical or abusive conduct in adjudicative fora constitutes a
'" The Court has held that the truth is a constitutionally required, absolute defense to
a libel suit. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974).
'3 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1314 (4th Cir. 1972).
'3, California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1972).
'
381 U.S. at 670, quoted in California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 511 (1972).
'3

404 U.S. at 515-16.

E.g., Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Ltd., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Semke v. Enrid
Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972); United States Dental Inst. v. American
Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
"' See, e.g., Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence
Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to MaliciousProsecutionandAbuse of Process,
86 HnAv. L. REv. 715 (1973).
'3
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sham. In Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Association,"' for example, the Tenth Circuit defined the sham exception in the adjudicatory context as "misuse or corruption of the legal process." 4 Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit, in Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., " stated that activities that "impair the fair and impartial
functioning of an administrative agency" ' are a sham. 4 5 Under this

interpretation of California Motor Transport, there are two sham
exceptions. Attempts to influence the legislature or executive by
unethical or abusive conduct will not be labeled a sham unless there
is no genuine intent to influence governmental action. In contrast,
abusive or unethical conduct in an adjudicative setting is a sham
regardless of whether there is a genuine design to influence the
government. 4 ' It is unlikely, however, that the Court in California
Motor Transport intended to erect such an anomalous standard. 4 '
California Motor Transport squarely placed the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine on a first amendment footing. The discussion of abusive
tactics was probably intended to help define the limits of the first
amendment right to petition adjudicative bodies, not to create a
separate definition for the sham exception. 4 8
The suggested interpretation of CaliforniaMotor Transportis
supported by the Court's decision in Otter Tail Co. v. United
States.'4 In Otter Tail, the government brought a civil antitrust
456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1366.
14 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
"I Id. at 278.
"1 See also REA Express, Inc. v. California Motor Transp. Co., 1975 Trade Cases
60,386 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (courts must apply a stricter standard in determining whether lobbying activities constitute a sham in the adjudicatory context).
"I Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Haw. 1972),
aff'd, 489 F.2d 203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1974), suggests still another interpretation of the sham exception. In Aloha, the court held that a complaint that alleged that
defendant opposed an application before the CAB with "the predatory intent and purpose of
eliminating plaintiff as a viable competitor" stated a cause of action under the sham exception. This interpretation of the sham exception, which equates anticompetitive intent with
illegality, is directly contrary to both Noerr and CaliforniaMotor Transport.
"I As the court in Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 1975 Trade Cases
60,187, at 65,634 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 1977 Trade Cases 61,562 (10th Cir.), correctly stated:
It is crucial to an understanding of the "sham" exception in the adjudicatory context to
note that the complaint in California Motor Transport alleged that the defendants
invoked the adjudicatory processes not for decisional purposes but solely to deter plaintiffs from use of the machinery, and thus to deny them "meaningful access" to the
decisionmaking processes.
I" This interpretation is buttressed by the majority's approving reference to the concurring opinion which emphasized that defendant's activities fell within the sham exception as
defined by Noerr. 404 U.S. at 512.
"1'331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
"

2
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suit, alleging that defendants both instituted and sponsored litigation opposing a proposed municipal power system. While none of
these lawsuits were successful, they nevertheless helped frustrate
the sale of revenue bonds to finance the power system. The district
court, writing before California Motor Transport, held that the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine was inapplicable to the institution of
judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the district
court's judgment for reconsideration in light of California Motor
Trahsport, but stated that CaliforniaMotor Transport established
that the sham exception applies "where the purpose to suppress
competition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims ... ."I"o By focusing on the repetitive
and insubstantial nature of the claims, the Court suggested that the
conduct alleged in California Motor Transport constituted a sham
because there was no genuine attempt to influence governmental
action.
Although California Motor Transport and Otter Tail are most
fairly read as equating the sham exception with the absence of a
genuine intent to influence the government, language in both opinions lends support to a view of the sham exception that accords with
the first amendment justification for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Both opinions emphasized that repeated prosecutions of baseless or insubstantial lawsuits are paradigmatically within the sham
exception. The repetitious filing of baseless lawsuits does indeed
indicate that any professed intent to influence the courts is spurious. There is also,' however, no substantial first amendment interest in ensuring that baseless claims are presented to adjudicative
bodies. The repetition constituent of the formula can be read as
guaranteeing that the plaintiff knows his claim to be unmeritorious.
Therefore, a plaintiff who repeatedly institutes baseless suits to
harm a competitor may be subjected to antitrust liability without
discouraging exercise of first amendment freedoms.
Some lower courts have split on the question whether the filing
of a single lawsuit, as opposed to a pattern of baseless litigation, can
constitute a sham. 151 Last Term in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend
" 410 U.S. at 380. On remand, the District Court held, without discussion, that the
allegations of the complaint stated a cause of action under the sham exception. 360 F. Supp.
451 (D. Minn. 1973). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed. 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
1 Compare Central Bank of Clayton v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Mo. 1976),
aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (1977); Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp.
19 (M.D. Fla. 1976); and Bethlehem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(all suggesting that a pattern of baseless litigation is necessary), with Associated Radio Serv.
Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (holding that the filing of one
lawsuit can constitute a sham).
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Corp.52 this issue surfaced in the Supreme Court. The central issue
in Lektro-Vend was whether section 16 of the Clayton Act,' 53 which
authorizes injunctions against violations of the antitrust laws at the
instance of private parties, expressly authorizes injunctions against
state court proceedings within the meaning of the anti-injunction
statute.'54 Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for three members of the
Court, ruled that section 16 does not.'5 5 Mr. Justice Blackmun,
joined by the Chief Justice, concurred in the result reached by Justice Rehnquist, holding that no injunction may issue against a state
court proceeding unless it is "part of a 'pattern of baseless repetitive
claims.' ""5" Justice Stevens, joined by three other justices, dissented, arguing that section 16 expressly authorizes injunctions
57
against state court actions which violate the antitrust laws.'
Upon first examination, it appears that the basis of the dispute
between Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens is a disagreement
over whether the bringing of a single state lawsuit can violate the
antitrust laws. Justice Blackmun relied on the cases explicating the
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, in which the
multiplicity of suits was indeed emphasized. Justice Stevens relied
on a wider range of cases in which improper use of judicial process
was held to be an antitrust violation. For example, Justice Stevens
discussed Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp.,' 58 which held that enforcement of a fraudulently
procured patent could violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Justice Stevens's interpretation of the relevant precedents is
irrefutable. Walker Process does indeed establish that bringing a
single lawsuit can violate the antitrust laws. Walker Process was
not, however, a case interpreting the sham exception. Walker
Process involved a genuine attempt to influence the government by
improper means. Walker Process is authority for revising the sham
exception to include all petitioning unprotected by the first amendment, but it is not inconsistent with an interpretation of the traditional sham exception requiring a pattern of baseless litigation.
Closer examination of Justice Blackmun's opinion in LektroVend reveals that he has not necessarily committed himself to the
,52
97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
,5'28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See generally Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute
Reconsidered, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 717 (1977).
' 97 S. Ct. at 2887-89.
' Id. at 2893 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
,' Id. at 2897-98.
,SA
382 U.S. 172 (1965).
"
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view that a multiplicity of suits is required to prove either a sham
or an antitrust violation. In a footnote Blackmun stated: "Since I
believe that federal courts should be hesitant indeed to enjoin ongoing state proceedings, I am of the opinion that a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims or some equivalent showing of abuse must
exist before an injunction would be proper."'' 5 This passage suggests
that Blackmun's view was predicated not upon antitrust doctrine,
but upon his view of the anti-injunction statute.
Thus, lower courts will find little instruction in Lektro-Vend
when deciding whether a single lawsuit can constitute a sham. The
touchstone of the traditional sham exception-the absence of a genuine intent to influence the government-suggests that although
repeated lawsuits are highly probative, they are not necessary to
constitute a sham. Similarly, a litigant need not repeatedly institute
baseless litigation in order for his activities to fall within the revised
sham exception proposed in this article. Objective proof that the
litigant knew he was instituting a single baseless lawsuit would
suffice.10
, 97 S. Ct. at 2893 n.*.
The Ninth Circuit has recently reinterpreted the sham exception. Franchise Realty
Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd., 542 F:2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1571 (1977). Plaintiffs, subsidiaries of McDonald's, alleged that defendants, two associations of restaurant and hotel employees and a labor union, had conspired
to "oppose, repeatedly, baselessly, and in bad faith, the granting of building permits," id. at
1078, by the San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals. The complaint further alleged that
defendant's actions denied plaintiffs "free and unlimited access" to municipal authorities.
The Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. In the first place, the
court stated that the sham exception "does not extend to direct lobbying efforts such as those
alleged here." Id. at 1080. Second, even if the sham exception does apply to direct lobbying
efforts, by definition it does not reach situations in which the defendant is genuinely attempting to influence government action. Because the defendants had successfully opposed plaintiffs' applications for building permits, the court found it "particularly hard" to characterize
defendants' conduct as a sham. Id. at 1079. Third, the plaintiffs had only alleged in a
conclusory manner that they had been denied access to municipal agencies. To permit plaintiffs to proceed to discovery on the basis of notice pleading would impermissibly inhibit
exercise of the first amendment right to petition the government. Id. at 1082.
The first ground of the Ninth Circuit's decision is unsupported by precedent or principle.
Otter Tail and CaliforniaMotor Transportheld that abuse of the right of access to adjudicatory tribunals can constitute a sham in the absence of any abusive conduct external to the
adjudicatory process, see text and notes at notes 137-150 supra,and constitutionally valueless
activity that adversely affects competition should not be immunized from antitrust liability.
See text and notes at notes 150-152 supra.The third rationale advanced by the Ninth Circuit
is attractive, but not recognized in other constitutional cases and contrary to the rule that
dismissals should rarely be granted prior to discovery in antitrust cases. 542 F.2d at 1090
(Browning, J., dissenting).
The central question presented in Franchiseis whether successful petitioning can ever
be a sham. See also Taylor Drug Stores, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 561 F.2d 211
(6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a single successful lawsuit cannot constitute a sham). On the
'

"'
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IV.

I1il

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION

The Noerr-Penningtonexemption can plausibly be asserted in
a variety of factual and legal situations. Unresolved questions remain concerning the exemption's application in most of these situations.
A.

Patent Infringement Cases

In CaliforniaMotor Transportthe Court held that access to the
courts is protected by the first amendment's guarantee of the right
to petition.' 1 On this point the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
which had ruled that the Noerr exemption does not immunize attempts to influence adjudicative bodies. The Ninth Circuit's opinion relied on a line of patent infringement cases in which use of the
courts to achieve anticompetitive ends was held an antitrust violation.' 2 The impact of California Motor Transport on these patent
one hand, that a legal claim is vindicated by the government is objective and strong evidence
that the petitioner did not knowingly prosecute a baseless claim. But if the Noerr-Pennington
exemption rests on the first amendment, the success of the petitioning activity should not
be dispositive: lobbying activity characterized by abusive tactics should not enjoy antitrust
immunity even if successful.
A related problem is presented when a party injured by governmental action that was
taken as a result of petitioning activity unprotected by the Noerr-Penningtonexemption seeks
to recover damages from the petitioners. Compare Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp.
v. Florida Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954) (damages are not recoverable when
there is an intervening governmental act), with Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied. 404 U.S. 1047 (1972)
(damages recoverable despite intervening governmental act).
Strong policy considerations support finding antitrust liability in at least some cases. In
the case where a monopolist extends his monopoly position by bribing members of a city
council, penalties for bribery or injunctive relief will not provide an adequate deterrent, since
the monopolist may have reaped windfall profits as a result of his lobbying efforts. Treble
damages are the only effective sanction. It should be emphasized, however, that situations
where the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the governmental action
is strong enough to impose liability will probably be relatively rare. It may not always be clear
whether the tactics of private parties were material, since precisely the same governmental
action might have resulted in the absence of lobbying tactics unprotected by the NoerrPenningtondoctrine. Cf. Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1894) (the Court
upheld the award of damages for malicious interference with contractual relations that was
caused by successful petitioning). In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 67172 (1965), however, the Court implied that no damages could be awarded where there had
been an intervening governmental act.
1' 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
,,2
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965);
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,
198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952); Lynch v. Magnovox Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938), cited in
Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd in
part and affd in part, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
The Ninth Circuit also relied on a report advocating the position that a patent infringe-
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infringement cases must be assessed.
1. United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co. In United
States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 63 the government brought an
antitrust action against Singer, the sole manufacturer of household
zigzag sewing machines, for conspiring with two foreign competitors
to exclude Japanese competition. The conspirators allegedly withdrew opposition to each others' patent applications in order to secure broad patents, invalidity considerations notwithstanding, and
cross-licensed the broad patents obtained so that Singer could enforce the patents in the United States to the exclusion of Japanese
competitors. Underlying these transactions the trial court discerned
"a common purpose to suppress the Japanese machine competition"'' 4 through infringement suits. The Supreme Court held that
Singer therefore violated section 1, even though the infringement
claims were not unfounded.
Singer was decided after Noerr but before California Motor
Transport. Singer and Noerr are reconcilable only if the antitrust
immunity for attempts to influence the government does not extend
to attempts to influence the courts. But the right of competitors to
band together and utilize the courts to exclude competitors, the
practice condemned in Singer, was held constitutionally protected
in CaliforniaMotor Transport. The only difference between the two
cases is that Singer involved additional activities, such as the collusive termination of a Patent Office interference proceeding, a practice which a concurring opinion found to be an independent antitrust violation. 6 5 Pennington,however, was also a case in which the
defendants had engaged in activities other than those protected by
Noerr, yet the Court there held that attempts to influence the government are protected even if part of a larger anticompetitive
scheme.' The broad rule of Singer, therefore, can no longer be
considered good law.
2. Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co. In a series of cases, some
decided before and some after CaliforniaMotor Transport, several
ment suit can constitute an antitrust violation:
Where it has been shown that an infringement suit has, in fact, been brought as an
integral part of an agreement or plan to violate the antitrust laws and that the defendant
sustained resulting damages, treble damages for antitrust violation should be recoverable, whether or not there was a colorable claim of infringement.
REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 24748 (1955).
W 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
161Id. at 194 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 197 (White, J., concurring).
'" See text at note 35 supra.
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courts have held that the bringing of a patent infringement action
can be an antitrust violation if part of an attempt to monopolize." 7
In the leading case of Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,' 68 for example, the alleged infringers of a patent counterclaimed for treble damages, charging that the patent holder had achieved a monopoly
position by acquiring and pooling patents and that the infringement
action was brought to enforce this monopolistic scheme. The holders
of the patents contended that they had a right to use the courts to
protect their interests. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument,
finding that the real purpose of the infringement action was to further the existing monopoly and eliminate competitors:
We fully recognize that free and unrestricted access to the
courts should not be denied or imperiled in any manner. At the
same time we must not permit the courts to be a vehicle for
maintaining and carrying out an unlawful monopoly which has
for its purpose the elimination of competition." 9
Kobe holds that the maintenance of an otherwise valid infringement action is violative of the antitrust laws if brought pursuant to
an unlawful scheme to monopolize. The conduct proscribed in Kobe
does not fall within either the traditional sham exception or the
proposed revision of the sham exception. The counterdefendants
were genuinely attempting to enforce legal claims maintained in
good faith. Accordingly, the Kobe doctrine, like Singer, is presently
of doubtful validity.
3. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp. In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 70 the Supreme Court held that enforcement
of a fraudulently procured patent may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. Unlike Singer and Kobe, Walker Process is consistent with
the first amendment rationale of California Motor Transport, because the assertion of a claim known to be baseless is not protected
by the first amendment. The decision in Walker Process may have
important implications that have not been generally recognized.
Since the patentee was genuinely attempting to influence the court,
the result is difficult to reconcile with the traditional sham excep"I7 See,

e.g., Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 993 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); Handigards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 921 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
"' 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
"' Id. at 424.
,7 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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tion. Although the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine was not discussed in
Walker Process, the case is consistent with the view that attempts
to procure anticompetitive governmental action are only exempt
from the antitrust laws if the means used are protected by the first
amendment. On this view, Walker Process would be authority for
subjecting to antitrust liability not only the monopolist who extends
his monopoly position by enforcing a fraudulently obtained patent
but also the competitor who attempts to achieve the same result by
bribing a legislator.
B. The Applicability of the Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine When
Government Officials Are Alleged to Be Co-Conspirators
In CaliforniaMotor Transportthe Court stated in dictum that
"[c]onspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor
may also result in an antitrust transgression." 17 ' The two cases cited
in support of this proposition are of questionable authority.
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 72 the first
case cited, did not hold that official participation in a conspiracy
deprived defendants of an antitrust exemption under Noerr.Rather,
the Court held that the Sherman Act was applicable precisely because the purchasing agent of the Canadian government was not
acting as a public official but as the wholly-owned subsidiary of a
defendant American corporation. The second case cited by Justice
Douglas was a Ninth Circuit decision 73 that was no longer good law
in that circuit.

74

The lower courts, after CaliforniaMotor Transport,are split on
whether participation by a government official in a conspiracy is
sufficient to preclude an antitrust exemption. In Metro Cable Co.
v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 75 plaintiff alleged that it was denied a
cable television franchise because of a conspiracy in which the
mayor and an alderman participated. The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that an attempt to influence legislative action can succeed only if
"

404 U.S. at 513.

172370
113
'7

U.S. 690 (1962).
Harmon v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
See Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969)

(Ninth Circuit refuses to follow its earlier decision in Harmon).
The controversy dates back to Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where the Court
pointed out that the case contained "no question of the state or its municipality becoming a
participant in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade." Id. at 35152. See generally Comment, ParticipantGovernmental Action Immunity from the Antitrust
Laws: Fact or Fiction? 50 TEX. L. REv. 474 (1974).
17 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
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public officials are persuaded to support the cause and that to deny
an antitrust exemption by labeling a persuaded public official a coconspirator would in effect abrogate the Noerr doctrine.' The Third
Circuit in Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster7 7 has taken the opposite
view. In Duke, plaintiffs alleged that various municipal corporations, private corporations, and a government official conspired to
ensure that municipal facilities boycotted plaintiff's products. The
defendants contended that the exclusion of plaintiff's products was
a result of petitioning activity directed to influence governmental
officials. The Third Circuit held that "[wihere the complaint goes
beyond mere allegations of official persuasion by anticompetitive
lobbying and claims official participation with private individuals
in a scheme to restrain trade, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
inapplicable."' 7 8
The position of the Seventh Circuit in Metro Cable is preferable
to that of the Third Circuit in Duke and the dictum in California
Motor Transport. Acceptance of the co-conspirator theory would
mean that although competitors have a constitutional right to petition the government, the right could be lost if the petitioning is
successful, because the government officials petitioned might be
labeled co-conspirators, and Noerr protection lost.'79 Although the
exception may have some utility in situations such as Continental
Ore, where the government official is acting solely to further economic interests, in most cases the co-conspirator exception is unworkable and should not be recognized.
C. The Applicability of the Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine to
Attempts to Influence the Government as Purchaser
One of the most important unresolved questions concerning the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine is whether it is applicable to attempts
to influence the government acting in a purely commercial capacity.
With the government playing an increasingly large role in the nation's economy, 80 exempting all attempts to influence the government as purchaser from the reach of the antitrust laws would
threaten the ability of the market to efficiently allocate resources.
Recent studies have shown, for example, that the government is
"I Id. at 230.
"7 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
,TEId. at 1282.
" See Note, supra note 86, at 856-57 (1968).
11 Total government purchases amount to approximately 150 billion dollars, about 11%
of the total GNP. See McLachlan, Monopoly and Collusion in Public Procurement:A Survey
of Recent American Experience, 8 ANTrrausT L. & ECON. REv. 69. 70 (1976).
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hampered in its procurement programs by various anticompetitive
practices of suppliers. 8 1 While the government may occasionally use
its purchasing power to promote policy objectives such as preferences for small business or minorities, governmental bodies as participants in the economy are more often governed by the same costminimizing incentives as private purchasers.1 2 The question is
whether efforts to influence the government in its role as a direct
participant in the economy should be treated differently from private commercial conduct where the antitrust laws clearly do apply.
Prima facie, efforts to influence the purchasing decisions of
governmental entities or agents acting in a wholly commercial capacity do not seem to be exercises of the right to petition for redress
of grievances. In ContinentalOre, the antitrust laws were held applicable to a conspiracy that involved "private commercial activity,
no element of which involved seeking to procure the passage or
enforcement of laws." 8 3 The Penningtondecision, however, suggests
the contrary. In that case, the Court held attempts to influence
public officials exempt from the antitrust laws even though part of
the alleged scheme involved direct attempts to influence the purchasing decisions of the TVA. The implications of Pennington are
not entirely clear, however, for it is not apparent from the opinion
whether the TVA was acting in a purely commercial capacity.
This apparent inconsistency in the Supreme Court caselaw has
led to contradictory results in the lower courts. The NoerrPennington doctrine was given its widest scope in United States v.
Johns-Manville Corp.8 4 In Johns-Manville, a district court held
that an alleged conspiracy to influence municipal government authorities to purchase only pipe with certain specifications, which
would have had the effect of excluding foreign pipe from the market,
was exempt from the Sherman Act. The court stated that "any
concerted activities . . . to influence the decision of public officials
on pipe specifications are constitutionally protected and cannot be
the basis of a finding of violation of the antitrust laws ...
."I85 The
Fifth Circuit reached a similar result in Household Goods Carriers'
Bureau v. Terrell. 8 In this case, defendant's efforts to persuade
government agencies not to purchase plaintiff's mileage guide
charts were exempt from the antitrust laws.

I2
'

"

See generally McLachlan, supra note 180.
The same reasoning applies when the government is acting as seller.
370 U.S. at 705.
259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
Id. at 452-53.
452 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
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A contrary result, however, was reached by the First Circuit in
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.187 In
Whitten, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had conspired to sell
their swimming pool products to governmental units by influencing
public officials to adopt their specifications for swimming pools.
Defendants allegedly used a wide variety of tactics, including misrepresentation about plaintiff's products and pressuring architects hired by public bodies to adopt their specifications. The purchasing decisions were to be made strictly by economic criteria, as
required by competitive-bidding statutes. The First Circuit held
that defendant's conduct, while not necessarily an antitrust violation, was beyond the scope of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine: "We
conclude, therefore, that the immunity for efforts to influence
public officials in the enforcement of laws does not extend to efforts
to sell products to public officials acting under competitive bidding
statutes."'8 8
The approach of the First Circuit represents a desirable limitation on the scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 8 ' Where the
government is making purely economic decisions as a consumer in
the economy, the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine should not provide a
shield for anticompetitive behavior. 9 ' If the role of the government
in an anticompetitive scheme involves no policy determinations-if
the governmental unit simply seeks to obtain the most favorable
purchasing terms-application of the antitrust laws to such a
scheme no more infringes first amendment interests than does the
prohibition of anticompetitive conspiracies in the context of private
commercial activity.
This is not to say, of course, that all attempts to influence
government purchasing agents are unprotected by the first amendment. In light of the Supreme Court's extension of first amendment
protection to commercial speech, 9' activity that consists simply of
the accurate presentation of facts relevant to governmental decisions should be immune from antitrust sanction. But the NoerrPennington exemption must be kept distinct from the issue of pro424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
Id. at 33. The First Circuit also stated that its holding would not infringe the right to
petition because "[tihe First Amendment does not provide the same degree of protection to
purely commercial activity that it does to attempts at political persuasion." Id. But see note
121 supra.
"' See also Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 592 n.10 (7th Cir.
1977).
"I In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), a pre-Noerr case, the Supreme Court held
that the Sherman Act was applicable to a conspiracy to fix prices and suppress competition
while selling to a state government.
"' See cases cited in note 121 supra.
'

"'
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tection for commercial speech. The free speech issues raised by such
cases should be treated in the same fashion as those arising in private conspiracies, and must not be avoided by the unwarranted
invocation of the Noerr-Penningtonexemption.
D. Joint Efforts to Influence the Adoption of Standards and Rates
by Government Agencies
The antitrust laws limit the freedom of private groups to set
industry-wide standards.'9 2 The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine becomes relevant when private groups attempt to influence the promulgation of standards by the government. In many instances government regulators are highly dependent on the regulated industries
for reliable and accurate information. For example, the Federal
Water Pollution Act'13 requires the Environmental Protection
Agency to consider the available technology and economic consequences before establishing effluent controls. Representatives of affected industries formed trade associations for the purpose of presenting the EPA with needed comprehensive data.'9 4 This need for
information has justified many other cooperative arrangements between the government and industry in the setting of standards. 95'
When competitors have attempted to influence agency standards by reporting results of joint research and development, however, antitrust problems have arisen. In United States v. Automobile ManufacturersAssociation, ' the Justice Department brought
suit against the major automobile manufacturers, charging that
they had conspired to delay compliance with automobile emission
standards enacted by the state of California. In furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy, the manufacturers informed government agencies that they would be unable to comply with state standards by a
certain date. Faced with the government suit, the defendants agreed
to the entry of a consent decree, which, inter alia, prohibited joint
statements to government agencies concerning the feasibility of
,,I
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961),
plaintiff alleged that an industry association created a standard under which gas stoves could
obtain a seal of approval. Members of the association were allegedly prohibited from supplying gas to stores that did not bear the seal. The Supreme Court held that restraints flowing
from the standard would be unduly restrictive and that a boycott of producers who did not
obtain the seal would violate the antitrust laws.
" 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970).
" See Bakke, Joint Efforts in Developing Standards, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 342-44
(1975).
"5 See Bakke, supra note 194, at 337-44; Montgomery, Voluntary Joint Efforts to Solve
Energy Problems, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 347 (1975).
'1"1969 Trade Cases 72,907 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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complying with a particular standard by a particular time.'97 The
expansive scope of the consent decree in the automobile industry is
plainly inconsistent with the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, which recognizes that competitors have a constitutional right to jointly petition the government.'
The present case law concerning joint efforts by regulated industries to influence rate structures established by administrative
agencies is also unsatisfactory. While some cases have held that
such efforts are protected under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine,'99
one recent case has reached a contrary result. In Motor Carriers
Traffic Association, Inc. v. United States,'00 the Fourth Circuit held
that collective rate bureaus, organizations of carriers that jointly
propose rate schedules, have no statutory or constitutional right to
protest the independent proposals of their member carriers. Although the group of carriers contended that their protests were protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the court rested its
holding on statutory grounds, failing to address the Noerr issue. 01
Precluding joint action by competitors to influence rates, like the
consent decree in the automobile industry, is contrary to the Noerr
doctrine. Absent a showing that the carriers collectively set and
enforced rate structures or otherwise exceeded the bounds of good
faith petitioning, rather than presenting proposals for agency decision, joint efforts to influence rate structures should be protected
under Noerr.
"IMoreover the decree has adversely affected other desirable cooperative efforts involving the government and the automobile industry. The Department of Transportation, for
example, has requested the assistance of the major automobile manufacturers in determining
the feasibility of specific proposals to reduce fuel consumption. Because many of the energysaving proposals being considered by the Department of Transportation involve pollution
control devices, the ability of the automobile companies to cooperate with the Department's
request by the consent decree is severely restricted. Montgomery, supra note 195, at 353.
"I It should be noted, however, that the consent decree was entered before the Supreme
Court extended the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to attempt to influence administrative
agencies. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). For a
post-CaliforniaMotor Transport consent decree which similarly infringes the right of access
to the courts, see United States v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 1976 Trade Cases 60,949
(D.D.C.).
"I E.g., United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 1977 Trade Cases
61,551 (N.D. Ga.).
- 559 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1977).
2
Judge Widener dissented on the statutory ground, and therefore expressed no opinion
on the carriers' Noerr-Penningtonclaim. Id. at 1257.
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E. Applicability of the Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine to Attempts to
Influence Foreign Governments
With the increasing disclosures of corporate lobbying activities
abroad, 02 the question arises whether the Noerr-Penningtondoc20 3
trine is applicable to attempts to influence foreign governments.
In Continental Ore the Court held that the attempt to influence the
Canadian purchasing agent was outside Noerr because the conspiracy involved only private commercial activity. By negative implication, it could be argued that an attempt to influence foreign governments which focused on the passage or enforcement of laws would
have been protected, since the Court attached no significance to the
20 4
fact that a foreign government was involved.
In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,205 however, a district court reached the opposite conclusion. The complaint in Occidental Petroleum alleged that defendants had conspired to prevent plaintiffs from exploiting their offshore oil concessions in the Persian Gulf by inducing foreign governmental interference. Defendants claimed that their activities were protected under
Noerr. The court rejected this contention, however, on the ground
that there is no first amendment right to petition a foreign government,"' and, similarly, the court stated that the concern expressed
in Noerr about the need for a representative government to be in27
formed was absent in the international context. 1
If the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine were based on statutory construction of the Sherman Act, the decision in Occidental Petroleum
would be hard to justify; it would be difficult to argue that Congress
intended attempts to influence our government to be exempt but
not similar attempts to influence a foreign government. But once it
is recognized that Noerr rests on the first amendment right to peti21' See generally McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust
Approach, 86 YALE L.J. (1976).
"I Conduct does not escape the antitrust laws merely because it takes place abroad if
there is the requisite effect on American commerce. E.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962).
" See Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 132 (1967).
1 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.) afl'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1971).
'"I Id. at 107-08.
2' Id. at 108. The court found, however, that the conduct of the defendants was exempt
from the antitrust laws under the act of state doctrine. Under the act of state doctrine,
judicial inquiry into the legitimacy of foreign governmental acts is foreclosed. E.g., Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Supreme Court has recently suggested that the act of state doctrine may not apply to commercial acts of foreign states. Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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tion, the reasoning of OccidentalPetroleumseems persuasive. Since
there is no first amendment right to petition a foreign government,
attempts to influence such governments should not be protected by
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.
F. Admitting Evidence of Activity Protected By Noerr to Show the
Purpose of Other Actions
In Pennington the Court held that activity protected under
Noerr "is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader
scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act."2 8 In a footnote, however, the Court stated that: "It would of course still be within the
province of the trial judge to admit this evidence, if he deemed it
probative and not unduly prejudicial . . . [and] if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions
2 9 For courts to exercise this right and
under scrutiny.""
admit evidence of conduct not itself unlawful to show the anticompetitive
purpose of other acts would seriously undermine the protection afforded by Noerr. Most courts have been properly reluctant to admit
evidence of conduct lawful under Noerr to show an overall anticompetitive scheme.2 10 In Lamb Enterprises v. Toledo Blade Co.,)21
plaintiff attempted to introduce a letter written by counsel for the
defendant ostensibly describing information gathered for presentation to the City Council in an attempt to forestall a competitor from
entering the cable television business. The Sixth Circuit held the
letter protected under Noerr, and affirmed a lower court's exclusion
of the letter as evidence of anticompetitive intent because it would
have been highly prejudicial. The first amendment rationale of
Noerr suggests that evidence of anticompetitive conduct protected
by Noerr should not be admitted to show that related activity was
improperly motivated. Admitting evidence of conduct protected
under Noerr to prove an antitrust violation, even if accompanied by
the dubious protection of a restrictive instruction, would discourage
2 2
exercise of the constitutional right to petition the government. 1
381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
20 Id. at 670-71 n.3.
211See, e.g., Lamb Enterprises v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1001 (1972); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D.
Pa. 1966). In cases where evidence of conduct protected under Noerr has been held admissible, courts have tried to minimize its prejudicial effect. See Household Goods Carriers' Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (error committed by trial court for
failure to give appropriate limiting instruction).
211461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972).
2I None of the cases cited by the court in Pennington for the proposition that evidence
of legal conduct may be admissible involved constitutionally protected activity.
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CONCLUSION

Application of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine has been fraught
with inconsistency because the basis of the doctrine has not been
unambiguously articulated by the Supreme Court. This article has
argued that the exemption from the antitrust laws established by
the Noerr-Pennington line of cases should be limited to conduct
protected by the constitutional right to petition the government.
The central inquiry is whether the conduct of the defendant asserting a Noerr-Penningtondefense merits first amendment protection.
General principles for determining whether petitioning activity is
constitutionally safeguarded have been proposed, drawing on first
amendment doctrines established in the free speech context.
The suggested approach admittedly requires substantial revision of existing law. The sham exception to the Noerr exemption
should encompass only constitutionally valueless activity, such as
deliberate misrepresentations, bribery, and the knowing assertion of
a baseless legal claim. Reformation of an inconsistent body of law
necessarily requires that some precedents be overruled and others
narrowed. The virtue of the suggested approach is that it affords full
and certain protection to first amendment freedoms while preserving the public policy favoring competition embodied in the antitrust
laws wherever constitutionally permissible.

